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A Reconsideration of the 
Risk Sensitivity of U.S. 
Banking Organization 
Subordinated Debt Spreads: 
A Sample Selection Approach
1.I n t r o d u c t i o n
ince the mid-1980s, a growing number of proposals have
 been set forth that would require large banking 
organizations to publicly issue subordinated debt on a regular 
basis.1 The earliest mandatory subordinated debt proposals 
were aimed at increasing the size of the financial cushion that 
could be used by the deposit insurer in the event of a bank 
failure. Subordinated debt was viewed as a relatively inexpensive 
substitute for equity capital, because subordinated investors 
receive their funds only after the deposit insurer is fully 
compensated and because the tax code permits corporations to 
deduct interest payments on debt instruments but not dividend 
payments on equity. Subsequent proposals were aimed at 
reducing regulatory forbearance. While such proposals vary in 
their specific details, some would use a bank’s ability to issue 
new subordinated debt as a market signal of its viability,2 others 
would use yields on subordinated debt to trigger supervisory 
actions,3 and still others would require banking organizations 
to shrink their assets when they could not issue subordinated 
debt instruments at a rate below a specified cap.4
The evolution of mandatory subordinated debt proposals 
has reflected deposit insurance reforms that were implemented 
since the mid-1980s as well as empirical information on the risk 
sensitivity of banking organization subordinated debt spreads. 
The 1980s began with considerable de facto too-big-to-fail 
(TBTF) protection provided to subordinated debtholders.5 
Studies using subordinated debt market data from the 1983-84 
period (for example, Avery, Belton, and Goldberg [1988] and 
Gorton and Santomero [1990]) and from the 1985-88 period 
(for example, Flannery and Sorescu [1996]) were unable to 
detect a significant correlation between bank-specific 
accounting risk measures and secondary-market subordinated 
debt spreads over comparable-maturity Treasury securities.6 
Because subordinated debt investors were not found to receive 
a premium for default risk, it was reasonable to infer that these 
investors could not substitute, even partially, for government 
regulatory oversight of large banking firms. 
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By the mid-1980s, however, the FDIC had put in place 
mechanisms, such as purchase and assumption transactions, by 
which it could rescue an insured bank subsidiary without 
protecting the holding company, or even all of the creditors of 
the insured bank.7 As these reforms were implemented, bank-
specific risks were found to be increasingly correlated with 
secondary-market subordinated debt spreads.8 With this 
increased risk sensitivity, mandatory subordinated debt 
proposals shifted toward using market signals to trigger 
supervisory actions (in some proposals, such actions would 
even include the revocation of a bank’s charter). 
In 1991, the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation 
Improvement Act (FDICIA): 1) required least-cost resolutions 
of failed depositories and 2) established the system of prompt 
corrective action (PCA). The PCA system imposes increasingly 
severe actions on undercapitalized banking organizations as 
their capital ratios decline, including restrictions on deposit 
interest rates; elimination of brokered deposits; restrictions on 
asset growth; restrictions on interaffiliate transactions; and 
required approvals for acquisitions, branching, and new 
activities.9 
Under PCA criteria, critically undercapitalized banks, 
defined as those with tangible equity capital less than 2 percent 
of total assets, must be placed in receivership within ninety 
days, unless such actions would not achieve the purposes of 
PCA, or within one year, unless specific statutory require-
ments are met.10 Also under PCA, sixty days after a bank is 
determined to be critically undercapitalized, the bank cannot 
make payments on subordinated debt without regulatory 
approval. Although these reforms could potentially reduce the 
expected default losses borne by subordinated debt investors, 
because of more timely and lower cost resolutions, numerous 
studies have consistently found evidence that post-FDICIA 
subordinated debt spreads remained closely correlated with 
various indicators of bank risk, including nonaccruing loans to 
assets, past due loans to assets, “other real estate owned” to 
assets, the ratio of (book) equity to assets, the ratio of total 
(book) liabilities to the market value of common stock plus the 
book value of preferred stock, cardinalized Standard and 
Poor’s or Moody’s bond ratings, supervisory ratings, and 
portfolio shares for lending and for trading activities.11
The National Depositor Preference Act of 1993 amended 
the Federal Deposit Insurance Act to establish a clear priority 
for the distribution of (unsecured) claims realized from the 
liquidation or other resolution of any insured depository. 
Because the National Depositor Preference Act lowered the 
liquidation standing of bank subordinated debt, it made it 
more likely that subordinated investors would incur losses in 
the event of a bank failure.12 In principle, this reform would 
unambiguously strengthen the subordinated debt market’s 
sensitivity to bank-specific risks. In fact, when Morgan and 
Stiroh (1999) compared the risk sensitivity of banking 
organization bond issuance spreads with the risk sensitivity of 
other corporate firm bond issuance spreads during the 1993-98 
period, they found that the relationship between issuance bond 
spreads and bond ratings was about the same for banks as it was 
for other corporate firms.13 This finding suggests that the 
market discipline exerted in the primary bond market (in the 
form of spread sensitivity to risk) was about equal for banking 
organizations and for other corporate firms during the post-
FDICIA period.
In this paper, we analyze banking organization funding 
strategies using a subordinated debt issuance decision model 
estimated with data from three deposit insurance regimes: 
the de facto too-big-to-fail (1985-87) regime, the purchase 
and assumption (1988-92) regime, and the post-FDICIA 
(1993-2002) regime. We argue that banking organization 
subordinated debt issuance decisions can potentially censor the 
data available on issuance spreads for subordinated debt 
instruments. To test this hypothesis, we estimate a sample 
selection model, which incorporates the issuance decision 
model, and an ordinary least squares (OLS) model, which does 
not correct for sample selection bias, to consider the risk 
sensitivity of observed issuance spreads (over comparable-
maturity Treasury securities) as well as the effects of 
instrument characteristics, such as issue size and frequency of 
coupon payments, on such spreads. The model is identified 
using information available to funding managers, such as 
supervisory ratings, but not to investors. Using this model, we 
find that issuance spreads are risk sensitive during all three 
deposit insurance regimes when a sample selection model is 
used. Importantly, we also demonstrate that the sign and 
significance of parameter estimates that do not correct for 
sample selection bias can be seriously misleading.
The paper proceeds as follows. We begin by specifying an 
issuance decision model for funding managers at large U.S. 
banking organizations with respect to subordinated notes and 
debentures. In Section 3, we use this issuance decision model in 
the specification of the sample selection model for observed 
issuance spreads on subordinated debt instruments. Parameter 
estimates are presented in Section 4 for the issuance decision 
model, for the sample selection model of issuance spreads, and 
for the OLS model of issuance spreads that does not correct for 
sample selection bias for each of the three regulatory regimes 
under consideration. Section 5 draws inferences from the 
estimated models about the credit risk sensitivity of subordi-
nated debt spreads under different regulatory regimes and 
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2. An Issuance Decision Model 
for Subordinated Debentures
It is widely recognized that firms gauge the market carefully in 
order to choose an opportune time to issue debt.14 In 1982, the 
Securities and Exchange Commission began allowing firms to 
register securities in advance of issuance under Rule 415. Shelf 
registrations allow firms considerable flexibility in the timing 
of their debt issuance.15 Securities “on the shelf ” not only 
enable firms to require investment bankers to bid competi-
tively, but also allow firms to refuse to sell when desirable 
bids for their securities are not forthcoming.
Banking organizations, like other corporate entities, may 
reduce their reliance on debt when their default probability 
rises. If expected funding costs are sufficiently risk sensitive, 
then riskier banking organizations may be less likely to issue 
subordinated debt instruments.16 Moreover, according to the 
“informed investor hypothesis,” a banking organization would 
issue subordinated debt upon the receipt of “good” news and 
would issue senior debt upon the receipt of “bad” news to 
separate investors with different, yet unobservable, beliefs on 
the probability of its failure.17
To measure the expected default probability of a given 
banking organization, we examine several bank risk proxies 
that have been used in previous bank market discipline studies. 
These include the ratio of nonaccruing loans to total assets 
(NATAit), the ratio of accruing loans past due ninety days or 
more to total assets (PDTAit), the ratio of other real estate 
owned to total assets (OREOit), the absolute value of the 
difference between assets and liabilities maturing or repricing 
within one year as a proportion of equity value (AGAPit), and 
the ratio of total book liabilities to the sum of the market value 
of common stock and the book value of preferred stock 
(MARKETLEVit).18 Higher values for these proxies should 
reflect greater default risk and/or a deteriorating financial 
condition for the banking organization, so it is expected that 
subordinated debt issuance would be less likely as these risk 
proxies rise in value.
Moreover, when economic conditions deteriorate, it stands 
to reason that fewer positive net present value projects may 
require external debt finance. Several proxies are used to assess 
the effects of business conditions on banking organization debt 
issuance decisions. First, poor current macroeconomic 
conditions may curtail the growth prospects of many firms 
simultaneously. Thus, a relatively high unemployment rate 
(UE) could be a harbinger of retrenchment in debt issuance 
activities by the corporate sector.19 Second, because stock 
market excess returns have been found to be negatively 
correlated with contemporaneous investment (Lamont 2000) 
and positively correlated with subsequent corporate 
investment (Fama 1981; Fischer and Merton 1984; Barro 
1990), it is likely that corporate debt issuance would also be 
negatively correlated with contemporaneous stock market 
excess returns (XR).20,21,22 Third, bond market stress may 
make it difficult for some firms to issue debt. For example, 
during periods when liquidity is at a premium, better known 
firms as well as larger issues are much more prominent in the 
primary debt market (Harrison 2001).23 Because bond price 
volatility—regardless of whether it is driven by liquidity shocks 
or credit-quality shocks—tends to increase underwriting costs 
in a nonuniform manner across firms, some firms may find it 
too costly to enter the public debt market when such volatility 
is relatively high. As a general measure for bond market stress, 
we use an implied stock volatility measure based on real-time 
S&P 100 (OEX) index option bid/ask quotes, supplied by the 
Chicago Board Options Exchange (MKTVOL).24 It is expected 
that bond issuance activities would be negatively correlated 
with MKTVOL. 
In addition, the costs and benefits of external finance are 
likely to vary across firms. For example, becoming a known 
“name” is said to lower issuance costs and to increase market 
demand and liquidity for an issuer’s debt.25 Because frequent 
issuers are likely to have issued subordinated debt more than 
once during an annual period, an indicator variable that equals 
1 when the banking organization has issued subordinated debt 
in the previous period (ISSUEi,t-1) is included in the issuance 
decision model to proxy for subordinated debt market name 
recognition.26
Because information is costly to analyze, major buyers of 
subordinated debt typically specialize so that they purchase 
large amounts of debt of a small number of large firms.27 This 
practice tends to reduce issuance costs for large firms. To detect 
this effect, we include the natural log of total assets, 
ln(ASSETit), in the issuance model.28
The existence of tax shelter benefits for corporate debt and 
increased risks of bankruptcy and agency costs with increased 
leverage not only affect the market value of each firm, but also 
determine its optimal capital structure. Hence, the firm’s tax 
rate and its leverage are important inputs for its debt issuance 
decisions. The higher the banking organization’s marginal tax 
rate, the greater its benefit from being able to deduct the 
interest payments paid to subordinated debt bondholders. 
As a proxy for the marginal tax rate facing each banking 
organization, we use its foreign and domestic income taxes as a 
percentage of net income (AVGTAX). As the amount of debt in 
the capital structure increases, the present value of tax savings 
will cause the market value of the firm to rise. However, at 
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resulting from increased leverage will cause the market value of 
the firm to be less than it would have been if the only influence 
was taxes. Indeed, it is possible that bankruptcy and agency 
costs become so large that the market value of the firm would 
actually decline with an increase in leverage. Thus, the capital 
structure of a firm at the time an issuance decision is made is 
likely to determine whether bond issuance would increase its 
market value. To account for differences in capital structure 
across banking organizations, we include the ratio of book 
equity to book total assets (K/A) in the issuance decision 
model. When this ratio is large, tax benefits from debt issuance 
are likely to outweigh the increased risk of bankruptcy and 
agency costs resulting from increased leverage, but this is less 
likely to be the case when K/A is small. Therefore, the rise in 
bankruptcy and agency costs associated with increased leverage 
suggests that debt issuance activities would be positively 
correlated with K/A.
Lastly, supervisors of a banking organization could 
potentially pressure its management to raise regulatory 
capital.29 To consider whether such pressure may have led 
some banking organizations to issue subordinated debt, we 
include two indicator variables. The first, BOPEC2, equals 1 if 
the composite supervisory rating equals 2, and 0 otherwise. The 
second, BOPEC345, equals 1 if the composite supervisory 
rating equals 3, 4, or 5, and 0 otherwise. Banking organizations 
with a composite supervisory rating of 1 or 2 are considered by 
supervisors the safest and most well-managed institutions. 
However, banking organizations with a composite supervisory 
rating of 3, 4, or 5 have moderate to substantial deficiencies that 
were uncovered during the examination process. Therefore, we 
would expect banking organizations with a composite 
supervisory rating of 3, 4, or 5 to be under some pressure to 
improve their total regulatory capital, which includes 
subordinated debt after implementation of the Basel Accord.
The foregoing discussion suggests that banking 
organization i’s decision to issue subordinated debt at time t 
will likely depend on its default probability (NATAit, PDTAit, 
OREOit, AGAPit, and MKTLEVit), business and bond market 
conditions (UEt, XRt, and MKTVOLt), factors that determine 
firm-specific benefits and costs associated with debt issuance 
(ISSUEi, t-1, ln(ASSETS)it, AVGTAXit, and K/Ait), and 
supervisory pressure (BOPEC2it and BOPEC345it). Thus, the 
decision to issue subordinated debt can be represented by
(1) ( ,
                         ,
                         , 
                         ),
ISSUEit h = NATAit PDTAit OREOit AGAP it MKTLEV it , , , , []
UEt XRt MKTVOLt , , []
ISSUEit 1 – , ln ASSETit () AVGTAXit KA ⁄ it , , , []
BOPEC2it BOPEC345it , []
where the variable ISSUEit equals 1 if banking organization i 
decides to issue subordinated debt in period t, and 0 otherwise.30 
It is assumed that h(.) is linear in all of the variables.31 This yields 
the following specification,32
(2) 
                 
             
    
                  ,
where the expected signs of parameters for the default risk 
measures (NATA, PDTA, OREO, AGAP, and MKTLEV) are 
negative; the expected signs of the parameters for business 
conditions (UE, XR, and MKTVOL) are negative; the expected 
signs of the parameters for banking-organization-specific 
factors (ISSUEt-1, ln(ASSETS), AVGTAX, and K/A) are 
positive; and the expected signs of parameters for supervisory 
pressure (BOPEC2 and BOPEC345) are positive.
To estimate equation 2, we use standard latent variable 
techniques and treat the decision to issue as a continuous 
unobserved variable representing the probability that a 
banking organization issues subordinated debt. These 
techniques imply,
(3 )  [
            
             
                
            
                ]
and
(3 )     ,
where   is the standard normal cumulative distribution 
function. This probit model was estimated using quarterly data 
for the top fifty U.S. bank holding companies33 for three 
regulatory regimes: the de facto TBTF (1985-87) regime, the 
purchase and assumption (1988-92) regime, and the post-
FDICIA (1993-2002) regime.
ISSUEit β0 β1NATAit β2PDTAit β3OREOit +++ =
β4 AGAP it β5MKTLEV it β6UEt β7XRt ++ + +
β8MKTVOLt β9ISSUEit 1 – , β10ln ASSETit () +++
β11AVGTAXit β12KA ⁄ it β13BOPEC2it ++ +
β14BOPEC345it εit ++
′ Prob ISSUEit 1 = () Φ = β0 β1NATAit β2PDTAit ++
β3OREOit β4AGAPit β5MKTLEVit +++
β6UEt β7XRt β8MKTVOLt +++
β9ISSUEit 1 – , β10ln ASSETit () ++
β11AVGTAXit β12KA ⁄ it β13BOPEC2it ++ +
β14BOPEC345it +
″ Prob ISSUEit 0 = () 1 Prob ISSUEit 1 = () – [] =
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3. A Sample Selection Model 
for Observed Issuance Spreads
At the time of issue, each subordinated debt instrument is most 
likely to be “on-the-run,” rather than “off-the-run.”34 Thus, 
when the risk sensitivity of observed issuance spreads is 
considered, the potentially important effects of liquidity 
differences on bond spreads are minimized.35
Issuance spreads are likely to depend on the issuing banking 
organization’s financial condition, size, and frequency of 
coming to the market; on systematic risks; and on the 
characteristics of the instrument that is issued. As with the 
issuance decision model, we measure the financial condition of 
banking organization i by the ratio of nonaccruing loans to 
total assets (NATAit), the ratio of accruing loans past due 
ninety days or more to total assets (PDTAit), the ratio of other 
real estate owned to total assets (OREOit), the absolute value of 
the difference between assets and liabilities maturing or repric-
ing within one year as a proportion of equity value (AGAPit), 
and the ratio of total book liabilities to the sum of the market 
value of common stock and the book value of preferred stock 
(MARKETLEVit). Bank size is again measured by ln(ASSET) 
and the frequency of issuance is proxied by ISSUEi,t-1. 
Investors may require a risk premium to compensate for 
systematic, rather than diversifiable, risk.36 Several researchers 
have demonstrated that corporate bond returns vary 
systematically with the same factors, such as excess stock 
returns, that are commonly accepted as explaining risk 
premiums for common stocks.37 Moreover, time-series models 
for secondary-market subordinated debt spreads for large U.S. 
banking organizations suggest that such spreads are correlated 
with excess stock returns.38 Hence, a quarterly excess stock 
return constructed from the Center for Research in Security 
Prices’ daily value-weighted return on NYSE, Amex, and 
Nasdaq stocks and daily one-month Treasury bill rates, XR, is 
included in our observed issuance spread model. 
Table 1 presents instrument characteristics—such as 
imbedded call options, maturity lengths, and coupon 
frequencies—for the subordinated notes and debentures with 
issuance amounts in excess of $75 million that were issued by 
the top fifty bank holding companies during the 1985-2002 
period.39 Fixed-rate, noncallable, semiannual coupon, long-
term (ten-to-twenty-year) bonds were the most commonly 
issued instruments during the sample period. By and large, 
issues of the twenty largest BHCs tended to be more 
standardized than issues of smaller BHCs.40 In addition, larger 
holding companies were more likely to issue subordinated debt 
with a larger issue size.41
In principle, the value of a call option is always non-
negative. This means that the “raw” calculated subordinated 
debt spread overestimates the default risk premium.42 An 
indicator variable, CALL, that equals 1 when an issue has a call 
option, and 0 otherwise, is included in the regression equation 
for observed issuance spreads. Since call options are always 
non-negative, it is expected that the sign on CALL would be 
positive.43 The percentage of new subordinated debt issues that 
are callable varies considerably across time for the top fifty 
banking organizations (Table 1). 
In addition, bonds with nonstandard maturities may be less 
liquid than bonds with standard maturities.44 If so, then bonds 
with nonstandard maturities would have larger spreads, ceteris 
paribus. To capture nonstandard maturity effects on spreads, 
we include an indicator variable for bonds issued with a 
maturity of less than ten years, MATLT10, and an indicator 
variable for bonds issued with a maturity greater than twenty 
years, MATGT20, in the issuance spread regression.45 Each of 
these indicator variables equals 1 for the specified maturity 
range, and 0 otherwise. Since nonstandard maturities are 
expected to raise spreads, it is expected that the sign on these 
maturity indicator variables would be positive. 
It also seems reasonable that coupon frequency could affect 
the types of investors willing to purchase an issue. Presumably, 
a higher coupon frequency (for example, with monthly coupon 
payments) would attract smaller “retail” investors, and the 
resulting higher demand would lower the issuance spread. To 
capture this potential effect on the subordinated debt spread, 
we include two indicator variables, COUPON12 and 
COUPON2, that equal 1 when the coupon frequency is 
monthly and semiannual, respectively, and 0 otherwise. Our 
reasoning suggests that the coefficients on the monthly coupon 
frequency indicator will be negative. Interestingly, monthly 
coupons are observed only on subordinated notes and 
debentures issued in the post-FDICIA period (Table 1).
It is expected that issuance spreads are likely to be negatively 
correlated with issuance size (ISSUESIZE) for at least two 
reasons. First, larger issues may command higher prices (lower 
spreads) because smaller issues tend to be less liquid in the 
secondary market.46 For this reason, smaller issues are more 
difficult and expensive to sell to institutional investors.47 
Second, given a banking organization’s total assets and its 
equity-capital ratio, a larger bond issue (one with a larger 
issuance size) could reflect an organization having a larger 
proportion of subordinated bonds relative to deposits. The 
higher preference given to depositors than to subordinated 
debtholders in bankruptcy implies that expected recovery rates 
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Table 1
Characteristics of Subordinated Debt Instruments Issued by Large U.S. Banking Organizations
Annual Data, 1985-2002
Pre-FDICIA Period
1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992
Maturity (percent)
   Less than ten years 0.00  0.00 16.67 0.00 22.22 10.00 46.67 34.48
   Ten to twenty years 66.67 50.00 79.17 100.00 66.67 80.00 46.67 65.52
   More than twenty years 33.33 50.00 4.17 0.00 11.11 10.00 6.67 0.00
Call option (percent)
   Yes 33.33 100.00 12.50 25.00 11.11 0.00 0.00 0.00
   No 66.67 0.00 87.50 75.00 88.89 100.00 100.00 100.00
Coupon frequency (percent)
   Monthly 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
   Semiannual 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 96.67 100.00
   Quarterly 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
   Zero coupon 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 3.33 0.00
Amount issued (millions of dollars)
   Maximum 150.00 250.00 300.00 300.00 400.00 200.00 750.00 500.00
   Minimum 150.00 150.00 75.00 150.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00
   Mean 150.00 200.00 188.54 187.50 180.56 138.70 174.00 192.79
   Median 150.00 200.00 200.00 150.00 150.00 118.50 137.50 200.00
   Total 450.00 800.00 4,525.00 750.00 3,250.00 1,387.00 5,220.00 11,182.00
Floating rate (percent) 0.00 0.00 8.33 0.00 11.11 0.00 0.00 0.00
Total number issued per annum 3 4 24 4 18 10 30 58
Post-FDICIA Period
1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002
Maturity (percent)
   Less than ten years 20.00 25.00 41.46 28.57 7.69 15.00 30.00 33.33 35.71 0.00
   Ten to twenty years 77.78 71.43 41.46 60.00 57.69 45.00 60.00 66.67 35.71 85.71
   More than twenty years 2.22 3.57 17.07 11.43 34.62 40.00 10.00 0.00 28.57 14.29
Call option (percent)
   Yes 0.00 32.14 31.71 5.71 11.54 20.00 10.00 16.67 57.14 14.29
   No 100.00 67.86 68.29 94.29 88.46 80.00 90.00 83.33 42.86 85.71
Coupon frequency (percent)
   Monthly 0.00 0.00 2.44 5.71 3.85 0.00 0.00 0.00 14.29 0.00
   Semiannual 95.56 100.00 97.56 94.29 73.08 85.00 100.00 100.00 85.71 85.71
   Quarterly 4.44 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 14.29
   Zero coupon 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 23.08 15.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Amount issued (millions of dollars)
   Maximum 600.00 300.00 443.40 500.00 800.00 601.50 1,000.00 1,900.00 3,000.00 700.00
   Minimum 75.00 100.00 99.80 75.00 85.00 100.00 173.60 75.00 76.03 225.00
   Mean 205.00 188.36 193.22 244.87 289.13 284.34 456.95 679.17 458.02 403.57
   Median 200.00 150.00 150.00 247.90 250.00 250.00 374.30 400.00 149.61 300.00
   Total 9,225.00 5,274.20 7,921.90 8,570.50 7,517.30 5,686.68 4,569.50 4,075.00 6,412.24 2,825.00
Floating rate (percent) 4.44 0.00 0.00 2.86 0.00 15.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
T o t a l  n u m b e r  i s s u e d  p e r  a n n u m 4 52 84 13 52 62 01 0 61 4 7
Sources: Moody’s Default Risk Service database; Fixed Investment Securities database; Warga database; Bloomberg database.
Notes: In each quarter, we include a banking organization in our sample only if it was in the top fifty after all U.S. bank holding companies were ranked 
by total assets. Each subordinated debt instrument has an issuance size of at least $75 million. FDICIA is the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation 
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subordinated debt relative to deposits, ceteris paribus. Higher 
expected recovery rates would imply lower issuance spreads.48
Although previous market discipline studies have used 
ordinary least squares techniques to estimate the risk sensitivity 
of banking organization subordinated debt spreads, we 
recognize that such procedures are inappropriate because 
subordinated debt spreads are observed only for those bank 
holding companies that have actually chosen to issue 
subordinated debt. For example, banking organizations that 
would have had an issuance spread above their reservation 
spread level would not be included in such estimation 
procedures. Since the data on issuance spreads are censored, 
OLS estimates based on such subsamples would not provide 
consistent estimates for the risk sensitivity of debt spreads. To 
address this sample selectivity problem, we use Heckman’s 
two-stage method.49 This method involves estimating the 
issuance decision equation with probit (described above), and 
then using the inverse Mills ratio function of the probit 
residuals as an extra variable in a regression for the observed 
issuance spreads.50
In summary, the regression estimated for observed issuance 
spreads over Treasury securities with comparable maturities 
is:51,52
(4) 
                          
                         
                         
                         
                   .
Each observed SPREADit was calculated from observed bond 
prices using derived yields on each bond calculated by the 
Newton-Ralphson iterative method and an interpolated 
Treasury yield of the same maturity.53
4. Empirical Results
4.1 Issuance Decisions
The issuance decision and issuance spread models were 
estimated using quarterly data. Table 2 presents parameter 
estimates (with t-statistics in parentheses) for the issuance 
decision probit model, equation 3, for each of the three 
regulatory regimes: the de facto too-big-to-fail (1985-87) 
SPREADit αγ 1NATAit γ2PDTAit γ3OREOit +++ =
γ4 AGAP it γ5MKTLEV it γ6 ISSUEit 1 – , ++ +
γ7ln ASSETit () γ8XRt γ9CALLit ++ +
γ10 MATLT10it γ11MATGT20t ++
γ12COUPON12it γ13COUPON2it ++
γ14ISSUESIZE γ15MILLSRATIOit εit ++ +
regime, the purchase and assumption (1988-92) regime, and 
the post-FDICIA (1993-2002) regime.54 Because explanatory 
variables such as banking-organization-specific risk proxies, 
supervisory ratings, leverage, and asset size are related 
to each other, the variances of each of these individual 
parameter estimates can be misleadingly large. Such relation-
ships imply that joint tests of parameter estimates (Wald 
tests) for the traditional risk proxies (NATA, PDTA, OREO, 
AGAP, and MKTLEV) are more appropriate than mere 
tabulations of their individual parameters with the expected 
and significant sign. 
Interestingly, the traditional banking-organization-specific 
risk proxies significantly affected the likelihood that large U.S. 
banking organizations would issue subordinated debt in the 
purchase and assumption regime and in the post-FDICIA 
period. Wald test statistics for the traditional risk proxy 
parameter estimates jointly equaling 0 are 45.3 and 76.0 in 
these two periods, respectively. Each of these test statistics is 
greater than the critical value for the Wald test at a 5 percent 
confidence level (11.1).55 In contrast, the Wald statistic for this 
joint test for the significance of the traditional banking-
organization-specific risk proxies is only 8.6 in the de facto 
TBTF regime. 
 Banking-organization-specific factors, such as asset size 
(ln(ASSETS)) and whether the banking organization had 
issued subordinated debt in the previous six-month period 
(ISSUEt-1), also significantly influenced funding manager 
decisions. Larger banking organizations and more frequent 
issuers were more likely to issue subordinated debt during each 
of the three deposit insurance regimes considered. 
Overall market conditions matter when it comes to bank 
subordinated debt issuance decisions. In the de facto TBTF 
period, higher unemployment (UE) significantly reduced bank 
subordinated debt issuance activities. In addition, in both the 
de facto TBTF period and the purchase and assumption period, 
it was less likely for a large U.S. banking organization to issue 
subordinated debt in periods of bond market illiquidity, that is, 
when the implied volatility (MKTVOL) increased.
Importantly, banking organizations with supervisory 
ratings in the 3 to 5 range were less likely to issue subordinated 
debt during the de facto TBTF period. To the extent that this 
risk measure proxies for “private information” held by the 
funding manager, this finding suggests that subordinated debt 
issuance activities were used to signal “good” financial 
prospects to the market.56 These results also suggest that 
supervisors were not pressuring banking organizations that 
were in financial distress during this period to increase the 
noninsured liabilities “buffer” that would absorb potential 
losses from their failure.80 A Reconsideration of the Risk Sensitivity
Table 2
Parameter Estimates for Issuance Decision Model for Subordinated Debt 
Large U.S. Banking Organizations, Alternative Deposit Insurance Regulatory Regimes
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Table 2 (Continued)
Parameter Estimates for Issuance Decision Model for Subordinated Debt 
Large U.S. Banking Organizations, Alternative Deposit Insurance Regulatory Regimes
Model Statistics De Facto TBTF Purchase and Assumption Post-FDICIA Sample
Wald tests
   Wald test statistics for traditional risk coefficients
      jointly equaling 0 8.6 45.3 76.0
   Critical value for Wald test at 5 percent 
      confidence level 11.1 11.1 11.1
Goodness-of-fit measures
   Fraction of correct predictions for issuance 
      decision 0.88 0.84 0.85
   R2 0.24 0.21 0.31
   Number of observations  539  941  1,933
   Percentage that issued subordinated debt 14.47 18.28 21.83
Source: Authors’ calculations.
Notes: All specifications include a constant term significant at the 5 percent level. Year indicator variables, which equal 1 in a specific year of each panel, 
and 0 otherwise, are also included, although these coefficient estimates are not reported. Observed spread regressions are heteroskedastic-consistent.
t-statistics are in parentheses. Significance is indicated at the 10 percent level. TBTF is too-big-to-fail; FDICIA is Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation 
Improvement Act of 1991.
4.2 Issuance Spreads 
The importance of correcting for sample selection biases that 
result from funding manager decisions is strikingly apparent 
from Table 3. The table presents parameter estimates for the 
sample selection model (that includes the inverse Mills ratio), 
equation 4, and an OLS model (that does not include the 
inverse Mills ratio) for banking organization primary-market 
spreads in each of the three deposit insurance regimes. In these 
models, as was the case with the issuance decision model, the 
relationships between the banking-organization-specific risk 
proxies imply that the variances of each of these individual 
parameter estimates can be misleadingly large. Therefore, it is 
important to again consider joint tests of parameter estimates 
(Wald tests) for the traditional risk proxies (NATA, PDTA, 
OREO, AGAP, and MKTLEV).57 To ascertain the sign of the 
joint risk effect, we present in Table 3 information on: 1) the 
distribution of the joint risk effects calculated using the 
parameter estimates and banking-organization-specific values 
for the five risk proxies, 2) the sign and significance of a risk 
aggregate that is constructed using principal components 
techniques,58 and 3) the sum of the “normalized” marginal risk 
effects.59
 Importantly, in the de facto TBTF period, the Wald statistic 
for the joint test for the significance of the traditional banking-
organization-specific risk proxies is well in excess of the critical 
value for the 5 percent confidence level when a sample selection 
model is used, but the Wald statistic is below this critical 
threshold when an OLS model that does not correct for sample 
selection bias (henceforth referred to as the “OLS model”) is 
used. In addition, the distribution of the joint risk effects has a 
positive mean, with the vast majority of banking organizations 
having fairly large positive joint risk effects in the de facto TBTF 
period when a sample selection model is used (column 1), but 
the corresponding mean is negative and the vast majority of 
banking organizations have a negative joint risk effect when an 
OLS model is specified (column 2).60 Moreover, the principal 
component derived from banking-organization-specific risk 
effects is positive, albeit not significant, and the sum of the 
normalized marginal risk effects is also positive when a sample 
selection model is used. However, the normalized marginal risk 
effect is negative when an OLS model is used. The lack of much 
of a positive relationship between risk proxies and banking 
organization subordinated debt spreads when using the OLS 
model for the de facto TBTF (1985-88) period is consistent 
with results from similar tests performed in the literature using 82 A Reconsideration of the Risk Sensitivity
Table 3
Parameter Estimates for Sample Selection Model and Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) Model 
for Observed Subordinated Debt Issuance Spreads 
Large U.S. Banking Organizations, Alternative Deposit Insurance Regulatory Regimes
Deposit Insurance Regime/Explanatory Variable
De Facto TBTF, 
1985:1-1987:4
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Table 3 (Continued)
Parameter Estimates for Sample Selection Model and Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) Model 
for Observed Subordinated Debt Issuance Spreads 
Large U.S. Banking Organizations, Alternative Deposit Insurance Regulatory Regimes
Deposit Insurance Regime/Explanatory Variable
De Facto TBTF, 
1985:1-1987:4




Spread over Treasury Securities with Comparable Maturities
Sample Selection OLS Sample Selection OLS Sample Selection OLS
Model Statistics (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Wald tests
Wald test statistics for 
traditional risk coefficients 
jointly equaling 0 27.4 10.4 80.4 90.8 40.2 15.8
Critical value for Wald test at 
5 percent confidence level 11.1 11.1 11.1 11.1 11.1 11.1
Sign?
Distribution of estimated 
risk effectsb
Mean of distribution of 
estimated effects 0.689 -0.019 1.134 1.000 0.425 0.399














Sum of normalized marginal 
risk effects  0.24 -0.10 0.62 0.51 0.25 0.23
Inverse Mills ratio










R2 0.93 0.88 0.74 0.73 0.68 0.67
Number of observations 31 31 120 120 232 232
Source: Authors’ calculations.
Notes: All specifications include a constant term significant at the 5 percent level. Year indicator variables, which equal 1 in a specific year of each panel, and 
0 otherwise, are also included. Observed spread regressions are heteroskedastic-consistent. t-statistics are in parentheses. Significance is indicated at the 
10 percent level. TBTF is too-big-to-fail; FDICIA is Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation Improvement Act of 1991; ESS is expected and significant sign.
a Variable is described in Table 2. 
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secondary-market subordinated debt spreads for this period.61 
In stark contrast, the evidence of a positive relationship 
between debt spreads and risk proxies when using the sample 
selection model is consistent with studies using (bankruptcy-
remote) bank certificates of deposit during the mid-1980s.62
Wald test statistics for the traditional risk coefficients jointly 
equaling 0 are above the critical value for the 5 percent 
confidence level (11.1) in both the purchase and assumption 
(1988-92) period and the post-FDICIA (1993-2002) period, 
regardless of whether a sample selection model or an OLS 
model is used. Moreover, the distributions of the estimated 
banking-organization-specific joint risk effects contain only 
positive values in the purchase and assumption period (using 
either a sample selection model or an OLS model) and such 
distributions for the post-FDICIA period contain only a few 
negative joint risk effects. The mean of the distribution of the 
estimated joint risk effects is larger in the purchase and 
assumption period (1.134, column 3) than in the post-FDICIA 
period (0.425, column 5). These findings suggest that there 
may have been a decrease in the risk sensitivity of subordinated 
debt spreads between the purchase and assumption period and 
the post-FDICIA period.63 Consistent with this view, the 
parameter estimate on the principal component derived using 
risk effects during the purchase and assumption period is four 
times larger (0.223, column 3) than the corresponding para-
meter estimate for the post-FDICIA period (0.055, column 5). 
In both periods, these parameter estimates are positive and 
significantly different from 0 at the 5 percent level of 
confidence. Finally, the sum of the normalized marginal risk 
effects is more than twice as large in the purchase and 
assumption period than it is in the post-FDICIA period 
(whether a sample selection model is used or not). Together, 
these findings are consistent with subordinated investors 
perceiving that prompt corrective action by bank supervisors 
would likely reduce their expected losses in the event of a bank 
failure, despite their lower liquidation standing due to FDICIA 
and depositor preference rules.
The sign and significance of banking-organization-specific 
factors, such as asset size (ln(ASSETS)), can also be misleading 
when an OLS model, rather than a sample selection model, is 
used to analyze subordinated debt spreads. In the de facto 
TBTF period, larger banks have significantly lower issuance 
spreads when a sample selection model is used, but this is not 
the case when an OLS model is used with the same observed 
spreads. 
Interestingly, the effect of stock market excess returns on 
issuance spreads for banking organization subordinated 
debentures is only significant in the OLS models. This effect is 
positive and significant in the OLS models of issuance spreads 
for the purchase and assumption period and the post-FDICIA 
period. However, the effect of stock market excess returns is 
not significant in the sample selection models for banking 
organization subordinated debt spreads, regardless of the 
deposit insurance regime. This finding suggests that the effects 
of systematic risk factors on secondary corporate bond spreads, 
which have been documented in the literature,64 may partly 
result from researchers not controlling for the effects of 
issuance decisions on bond spreads. This is because secondary 
spreads may be stale, or unavailable, for firms that have not 
recently issued debt securities.
Not surprisingly, instrument characteristics significantly 
influence observed issuance spreads. Looking across the 
deposit insurance regimes, we note that different instrument 
characteristics increase or reduce spreads more in some 
regimes than in others, but it remains the case that deviations 
from the “plain-vanilla” benchmark (fixed-rate, noncallable, 
ten-year-maturity debt) generally significantly influence 
observed spreads. This finding implies that funding manager 
decisions with respect to instrument characteristics are also 
important to consider when one compares issuance spreads 
across banking organizations.65
Although the parameter estimate on the inverse Mills ratio 
is by itself insignificant in each of the deposit insurance regimes 
considered, inclusion of this variable importantly affects the 
significance and magnitude of the other parameter estimates 
included in the sample selection model. This finding, of course, 
suggests that the inverse Mills ratio is correlated with other 
variables in the model for issuance spreads. It also implies that 
funding managers do consider bank-specific risks and the 
other factors included in our issuance decision model to be 
important when deciding about issuing subordinated debt.
5. Market Discipline in Banking 
Reconsidered
Several studies of banking organization subordinated 
debentures (for example, Avery, Belton, and Goldberg [1988], 
Gorton and Santomero [1990], and Flannery and Sorescu 
[1996]) have found no statistical relationship between 
accounting-based measures of risk and subordinated debt 
prices prior to 1989, but did find such a relationship after 1989. 
Other studies using post-1989 secondary-market data with 
similar empirical models (such as Jagtiani, Kaufman, and 
Lemieux [2000] and DeYoung et al. [2001]) have also found a 
significant positive correlation between banking-organization-
specific risk measures and subordinated debt prices. Because 
deposit insurance reforms were implemented beginning in the 
late 1980s, some—maybe even most—observers took these FRBNY Economic Policy Review / September 2004 85
findings as evidence that conjectural government guarantees 
prior to these reforms made subordinated debt investors 
insensitive to banking-organization-specific risks.
In contrast, using information from the primary bond 
market during the 1985-88 period, we demonstrate that 
perceived government guarantees during that period did not 
make subordinated debt investors completely insensitive to 
bank-specific risks. Our sample selection model indicates that 
investors were able to differentiate rationally among the risks 
undertaken by major U.S. banking organizations. This result is 
consistent with early studies in the market discipline literature 
(Hannon and Hanweck 1988; Ellis and Flannery 1992) that 
have found that interest rates on relatively bankruptcy-remote 
large certificates of deposit were sensitive to bank-specific risks.
That being said, we also find market discipline to have been 
relatively weak in the pre-1989 period. During the de facto too-
big-to-fail (1985-87) period, we find that the distribution of 
estimated joint risk effects had a 20/80 split between negative/
positive effects, with about one-third of the observations lying 
between 1.5 and 2.0. Moreover, the parameter estimate on the 
joint risk effect derived using principal component techniques 
was positive, but statistically insignificant. Using the same 
issuance decision and sample selection models and the same 
methods for signing the joint effects, we find the strongest risk 
sensitivity of spreads during the purchase and assumption 
(1988-92) regime—a period when bank regulators reduced 
protections for large bank holding companies’ creditors.66
Interestingly, in the post-FDICIA (1993-2002) period, the 
risk sensitivity of issuance spreads appears to have waned a bit. 
Using sample selection models, we find that the estimated joint 
risk effects were more tightly distributed near zero in the post-
FDICIA period (Table 3, column 5) than they were during the 
purchase and assumption period (Table 3, column 3), that the 
mean of the distribution of joint risk effects was smaller in the 
post-FDICIA period than it was during the purchase and 
assumption period, and that the parameter estimate on the 
principal component during the post-FDICIA period was 
about a quarter of the size of the corresponding parameter 
estimate for the purchase and assumption period. These 
findings are consistent with the view that investors have taken 
seriously regulatory reforms that were tailored to limit the size 
of the safety net by increasing the losses borne by holding 
company subordinated debtholders in the event that their 
firm’s subsidiary financial institutions fail, as well as reforms 
(such as prompt corrective action) designed to limit potential 
losses given a default. Our findings suggest that the resulting 
default premia contained in subordinated debt spreads have in 
part reflected investors’ expectations with respect to these 
somewhat offsetting objectives.
Our results also suggest that market discipline has similar 
effects on banking organizations and other corporate entities. 
In particular, we demonstrate that issuance decisions for 
banking organizations are sensitive to firm-specific risks, just as 
others have found for nonfinancial firms (Castanias 1983; 
Marsh 1982). Consistently, Morgan and Stiroh (1999) find that 
the risk sensitivity of bank bond spreads is about the same as 
that of corporate bond spreads.
In sum, our empirical evidence indicates that market 
discipline is exerted on U.S. banking organizations in the 
primary debt market. Put differently, investors monitor 
banking organizations even in the absence of a formal 
mandatory subordinated debt policy. Our empirical analysis 
also suggests that tests for the risk sensitivity of secondary-
market debt spreads could be influenced by funding manager 
decisions that are sensitive to banking-organization-specific 
risks. For example, if the riskiest banking organizations never 
issued subordinated debt, then no secondary subordinated 
debt prices would exist for these firms. In this case, the sample 
selection problems for issuance and secondary-market spread 
analyses would be identical. This remains an important issue 
for further research, since many academics use secondary 
spreads to test for market discipline and bank supervisors and 
market participants monitor the secondary subordinated debt 
market spreads of large U.S. banking organizations.Endnotes
86 A Reconsideration of the Risk Sensitivity
1. Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System and 
U.S. Treasury Department (2000, pp. 58-65) contains a 
summary of fourteen subordinated debt proposals.
2. See, for example, Cooper and Fraser (1988) and Wall (1989).
3. See, for example, Evanoff (1993), Lang and Robertson (2000), 
and Evanoff and Wall (2000).
4. In the proposal set forth in Calomiris (1997), the subordinated debt 
rate would be capped at 50 basis points above the riskless rate; in 
Calomiris (1999), it would be capped at 3 percent above the Treasury 
bill rate.
5. For example, in July 1984 the Federal Deposit Insurance 
Corporation (FDIC) saved Continental Illinois Bank by providing 
“open bank assistance.” This was accomplished by purchasing 
$1 billion of preferred stock in the parent holding company, which 
was immediately downstreamed to the bank as common equity. 
Flannery and Sorescu (1996, pp. 1352-3) argue that this direct capital 
infusion into the parent holding company essentially protected 
investors who held subordinated debentures of the holding 
company. Flannery (1998) refers to 1984-89 as the too-big-to-fail 
period, while Jagtiani, Kaufman, and Lemieux (2000) refer to it as the 
de facto protection period for uninsured deposits and other debt.
6. Both Gorton and Santomero (1990) and Flannery and Sorescu 
(1996) estimate specifications that allow for the potential concavity 
of spreads in asset risk. 
7. See Flannery and Sorescu (1996, pp. 1352-3).
8. See Flannery and Sorescu (1996, pp. 1364-74).
9. Undercapitalized banks have a total risk-based capital ratio under 
8 percent, or a Tier 1 risk-based capital ratio under 4 percent, or 
a Tier 1 leverage ratio under 4 percent.
10. See Jones and King (1995). FDICIA required federal banking 
agencies to implement a capital-based policy of PCA that would begin 
in December 1992.
11. See, for example, Jagtiani, Kaufman, and Lemieux (2000), 
DeYoung et al. (2001), Hancock and Kwast (2001), and Morgan 
and Stiroh (2001).
12. See Section 11(d)(11) of the Federal Deposit Insurance Act 
(codified as amended at 12 U.S.C. §1821(d)(11)(2000)).
13. The authors also report that this relationship was weaker for bigger 
and for less transparent banks than it was for other banks.
14. See Covitz and Harrison (forthcoming) for a discussion of why 
banking organizations strategically time their public bond issues, and 
evidence that they do so.
15. With a shelf registration, securities can be sold up to two years 
later.
16. See Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (1999) and 
Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System and U.S. Treasury 
Department (2000, p. 36).
17. See Birchler and Hancock (2004, p. 4).
18. See, for example, Flannery and Sorescu (1996) and DeYoung et al. 
(2001). Balance-sheet and income statement data are from the 
consolidated financial statements for bank holding companies 
(Federal Reserve FR Y-9C Reports). These items are reported as of the 
close of business on the last calendar day of the quarter. Data on the 
market value of common stock are from the Center for Research in 
Security Prices tape, published by the University of Chicago’s 
Graduate School of Business. Both data sets are publicly available.
19. Although the parameter estimates are not reported below, model 
specifications were tested that included a leading indicator (the BAA 
interest spread) and a coincident indicator (industrial production) in 
addition to a lagging indicator of business conditions (the unemploy-
ment rate). These additional business condition variables did not 
significantly influence issuance decisions.  
20. Lags in the investment process (owing to delivery, planning, and 
construction lags) and time-varying risk premia can cause actual 
investment to be negatively correlated with current returns 
(Lamont 2000, p. 2720).
21. The influence of overall stock market excess returns on debt 
issuance activities may be weak. For example, Welch (2002) argues 
that the observed capital structure of U.S. firms is explained well by a 
firm’s own past capital structure and by its stock price appreciation. 
For the contemporaneous stock market excess return, we use the Endnotes (Continued)
FRBNY Economic Policy Review / September 2004 87
quarterly average of daily excess stock returns, calculated as the 
difference between the daily value-weighted return on New York 
Stock Exchange (NYSE), American Stock Exchange (Amex), and 
Nasdaq stocks and the off-the-run one-month Treasury return. 
22. The daily excess stock return is calculated as the difference 
between the daily value-weighted return on NYSE, Amex, and Nasdaq 
stocks and the off-the-run one-month Treasury return.  The quarterly 
excess stock market return is the quarterly average of daily excess stock 
market returns.
23. Harrison (2001) argues that a severe liquidity shock, such as after 
the Russian default in 1998:3, is in some ways as bad for the corporate 
bond market as a severe credit-quality shock, such as during 2000-01. 
With both types of shocks to the bond market, credit spreads widen, 
but issuance can be more strongly curtailed in the case of a liquidity 
shock, as some firms in the high-yield sector are completely shut out 
of the public debt market.
24. Implied stock volatility is exogenous to, but highly correlated with, 
bond market volatility.
25. See Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (1999, 
p. 46).
26. More explicitly, ISSUEi, t-1 equals 1 if banking organization i 
issued subordinated debt in either quarter t-2 or quarter t-3, and 
0 otherwise. 
27. See Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (1999, 
p. 47).
28. This proxy will also detect the risk reduction typically achieved by 
greater diversification or liquidity effects present at larger firms. See, 
for example, Morgan and Stiroh (2001, p. 200).
29. In recent years, supervisors have placed increasing emphasis on 
banking organizations’ internal processes for assessing risks and for 
ensuring that capital and other financial resources, such as 
subordinated debt, are adequate in relation to the overall 
organizational risk profiles. See Board of Governors of the Federal 
Reserve System, SR letter 99-18 (available at <http://
www.federalreserve.gov/boarddocs/SRLETTERS/1999/
SR9918.htm>).
30. To construct the ISSUEit variable, we use the CUSIP Masterfile to 
identify all subordinated debt issues of top fifty bank holding 
companies (BHCs). Then, for each subordinated debt issue, issuance 
dates are assigned using Moody’s, Fitch, Bloomberg, and Warga 
databases. ISSUEit equals 1 if banking organization i issued 
subordinated debt in either quarter t or quarter t-1, and 0 otherwise. 
Two-quarter issuance intervals are appropriate because U.S. banking 
organizations rarely issue subordinated debt instruments more 
frequently than twice per year (Board of Governors of the Federal 
Reserve System 1999, p. 46). Explanatory variables are lagged to reflect 
what was publicly or privately available at time t.
31. For continuous right-hand-side variables, the average value for a 
two-quarter interval is used; for binary right-hand-side variables, the 
average of the appropriate underlying variable over two quarters is 
used. The left-hand-side variable is set equal to 1 if the bank issues in 
a two-quarter period, and 0 otherwise. To enhance the exogeneity of 
the right-hand-side variables, we lag explanatory variables by one 
quarter.
32. Based on Flannery and Sorescu (1996), we also considered a more 
general specification in which all of the accounting risk measures 
except MKTLEV were interacted with MKTLEV and MKTLEV 2. The 
empirical results from this more general specification were consistent 
with those of the linear specification described in the text, with similar 
conclusions about market discipline.
33. In each quarter, the top fifty BHCs were defined as those organi-
zations that were among the fifty largest when such organizations are 
ranked by asset size according to holding company “Y Reports” 
submitted to the Federal Reserve. Thus, the top fifty BHCs can be 
different in each quarter. Most, but not all, top fifty BHCs have some 
publicly issued subordinated debt outstanding.  Bond issues by top 
fifty BHCs were identified using Standard and Poor’s Master CUSIP 
Directory. 
34. Older, or off-the-run, issues generally become absorbed into 
investors’ portfolios (see Sarig and Warga [1989], Amihud and 
Mendelson [1991], and Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve 
System [1999, p. 46]). 
35. Empirically, the dearth of liquidity for older bonds presents itself 
through larger discrepancies in recorded prices across alternative data 
sources. For bonds that are not actively traded, large discrepancies in 
prices can develop because: 1) each source uses different traders or 
broker-dealers for price information and their price records need not 
be simultaneous when a bond is not actively traded, 2) exchange-
based prices can contain significant liquidity-driven noise, and 3) it is 
difficult for investors to arbitrage price differences between illiquid 88 A Reconsideration of the Risk Sensitivity 
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securities. Like other corporate bonds, discrepancies in recorded 
prices across alternative data sources for subordinated notes and 
debentures issued by large U.S. banking organizations tend to increase 
with the issue’s age and to decline with issuance size (Hancock and 
Kwast 2001).
36. Elton et al. (2001) argue that corporate bond spreads could move 
systematically with other assets in the market because: 1) expected 
default losses could be correlated with equity prices (that is, default 
losses could decline with a rise in stock prices and default losses could 
increase with a fall in stock prices) and 2) the compensation for risk 
required in capital markets could change over time.
37. See Fama and French (1993) and Elton et al. (2001).
38. See Hancock and Kwast (2001).
39. Subordinated notes and debentures with issuance amounts of less 
than $75 million are generally included in medium-term note 
programs. Such issues are typically targeted toward specific retail 
investors and their issuance spreads include hefty liquidity premiums. 
Consequently, subordinated instruments with issuance amounts of 
less than $75 million are not included in the analysis of issuance 
spreads provided below. 
40. See Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System and 
U.S. Treasury Department (2000, pp. 9-13).
41. During the 1990s, the average size of a debt issue for the twenty 
largest BHCs more than doubled. Over the same period, the average 
size of a debt issue for the next thirty largest BHCs fluctuated around 
$200 million, despite the fact that the largest issue in some years was 
by a holding company in that group. 
42. The value of a bond’s call option increases with its maturity and 
the volatility of market interest rates, and decreases with the required 
call premium. See Avery, Belton, and Goldberg (1988), Gorton and 
Santomero (1990), and Flannery and Sorescu (1996) for discussions of 
the computation of option-adjusted spreads. Alternatively, Boardman 
and McEnally (1981) use a net present value calculation for deciding 
when to call an issue in their analysis of the factors that affect seasoned 
corporate bond prices. 
43. A negative or zero coefficient on the call option indicator variable 
would imply that debtholders did not value the call option 
appropriately.
44. Nonstandard maturity instruments may be issued by banking 
organizations to match the duration of their liabilities with the 
duration of their assets, or these instruments may be issued when an 
organization wants to attract funds from small retail investors.
45. Maturities and other instrument characteristics for each 
subordinated bond were identified using the Moody’s Default Risk 
Service database, the Fixed Investment Securities database, the Warga 
database, and the Bloomberg database as well as monthly issues of the 
Mergent Bond Record over the January 1984-December 2001 period, 
inclusive.
46. Smaller issues tend to be less liquid because they are typically 
absorbed rapidly into investor portfolios. Hancock and Kwast (2001) 
present histograms of weekly subordinated debt spread discrepancies 
between Bloomberg and Interactive Data Corporation pricing data 
sources over the January 1997-October 1999 period for bonds 
stratified by issuance size. The tightest distribution of spread 
discrepancies is for bonds with issuance sizes above $300 million. The 
next tightest distribution is for bonds with issuance sizes between 
$100 million and $300 million. The widest distribution is for bonds 
with issuance sizes below $100 million. The decreased dispersion in 
spread discrepancies for larger issues suggests that there may be a 
positive correlation between the flow of trade in a particular bond and 
its amount outstanding at issuance. 
47. See Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (1999, 
p. 46).
48. See Pennacchi (2001).
49. See Heckman (1979) and Killingsworth (1983) for a discussion of 
this two-step method for sample selection models.
50. Since the conventionally estimated standard errors and associated 
t-statistics are not consistent estimates for the regression for observed 
issuance spreads, it was necessary to compute heteroskedastic-
consistent standard errors. The heteroskedastic-consistent t-statistics, 
computed using White (1980), are reported below.
51. Note that there are extra identifying variables in the issuance 
decision model: UE, BOPEC2, and BOPEC345.
52. A nonlinear specification for the risk variables, similar to the one 
estimated by Flannery and Sorescu (1996), was also estimated. This 
specification yielded results that were qualitatively similar to those 
from the more straightforward to interpret linear specification Endnotes (Continued)
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reported. In addition, an alternative specification of the sample 
selection model for subordinated debt issuance spreads is presented in 
Birchler and Hancock (2004). Their findings are also consistent with 
those reported below. Thus, the results are not sensitive to the 
particular specification used in this analysis. 
53. Issuance prices were obtained from the Bloomberg “generic” bond 
pricing series, which is constructed using the consensus method that 
averages observed trading prices after dropping the highest and 
lowest observations. For the consensus method, a minimum of three 
observations is required, after dropping the highest and lowest 
observations, for a price to be valid, otherwise a missing value is 
entered for the trading price. Valid prices were obtained for all 
issuance dates. The term structure of Treasury interest rates was 
identified for each trading price issuance date by using a smoothing 
spline of the forward rate curve that incorporates a “roughness” 
penalty determined by generalized cross-validation. This splining 
technique is described in Fisher, Nychka, and Zervos (1995).
54. Parameter estimates with the expected and significant sign at the 
10 percent level of confidence are indicated in each regime with an 
“X.” 
55. A two-tailed test statistic is appropriate for this joint test because it 
is unclear whether more organization-specific risk would increase or 
reduce the likelihood that a funding manager would issue 
subordinated debt.
56. See, for example, Covitz and Harrison (forthcoming).
57. This approach is also used in Flannery and Sorescu (1996, p. 1361).
58. Each principal component is a linear combination of the original 
risk variables, with coefficients equal to the eigenvectors of the 
covariance matrix. We use the first principal component, which has 
the largest variance of any unit-length linear combination of the 
observed risk variables.
59. The normalization involves multiplying a variable’s marginal 
effect by the sample standard deviation of that variable. Summing 
these normalized effects across all risk proxies is akin to looking at the 
effect of a one-standard-deviation positive shock to all individual risk 
proxies. Given that the variables are highly correlated, shocking them 
all in the same direction is reasonable. Since the parameter estimates 
are not all positive, we note that this procedure does not provide an 
upper bound on the joint risk effect.
60. It is notable that the identifying variables in the issuance decision 
model (UE, BOPEC2, and BOPEC345) are jointly significant for the 
de facto TBTF period. The Wald test statistic is 10.664 against a critical 
value of 7.61 for a 5 percent confidence level.
61. See, for example, Flannery and Sorescu (1996, p. 1363).
62. See, for example, Hannon and Hanweck (1988) and Ellis and 
Flannery (1992).
63. The identifying variables in the issuance decision model (UE, 
BOPEC2, and BOPEC345) are jointly significant for the post-FDICIA 
period. The Wald test statistic is 9.782 against a critical value of 7.61 
for a 5 percent confidence level.
64. See, for example, Fama and French (1993) and Elton et al. (2001).
65. These findings are consistent with those reported in Morgan and 
Stiroh (2001). 
66. Flannery and Sorescu (1996) also find market discipline to be 
particularly strong during this period.References
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